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Our actions, including eye-and hand-movements, continually affect the sensory input we receive from the environment. Learning the regularities that connect our movements to their corresponding sensory outcomes allows the perceptual systems to discriminate self-caused sensory events from events caused by external sources (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Shin et al., 2010) . Indeed, immediately after performing an action, a stimulus that matches the learned action-outcome typically elicits a weaker behavioural and neural response, compared to a physically identical stimulus that does not match the learned action-outcome (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998; Bompas & O'Regan, 2006a; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010 ). This finding is described as sensory attenuation and has been explained in two different ways; first, it has been explained in terms of inhibition of the predicted sensory response (Blakemore et al., 1998) . Second, and paradoxically, sensory attenuation has also been explained in terms of preactivation of the predicted sensory response (Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012) . Although these two accounts of sensory attenuation are inconsistent, they both explain a wide range of empirical phenomena 2 . Before describing the present study, we begin with a brief review of the phenomenon of sensory attenuation as it is characterized by the two accounts.
Empirical demonstrations of sensory attenuation in the visual domain, were reported by Cardoso- Leite et al. (2010) and Roussel et al. (2013) , who had participants associate key-press actions with distinct visual action-outcomes during an initial acquisition phase (e.g., gabor stimuli with left/right orientation, respectively, linked to left/right keypress). Next, in a test phase, keypress actions continued to produce sensory outcomes, although the outcomes were now either congruent or incongruent with the learned contingencies in the acquisition phase. An "action-congruent" stimulus, in the present context, is defined as an outcome whose feature matches the actionoutcome association learned during the acquisition phase. In the test phase, participants reported the presence (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010) or the brightness level (Roussel et al., 2013) of stimuli as a function of action-congruency. Both studies found reduced visual sensitivity for action-congruent stimuli, relative to incongruent stimuli. Using a similar method, Pfister et al. (2012) found that even preparing an action, without performing it, can interfere with detection of learned action-outcomes (see also, Bompas & O'Regan, 2006a; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Stenner et al., 2014) . reduces signal strength caused by the cue, which should reduce the effect of the both valid and invalid cues in our paradigm. Panel (b): according to the preactivation hypothesis, internal prediction increases the baseline activity, i.e., "noise level", for the predicted feature, which should strengthen the effect of valid cues. Critically, the increased baseline activity also means that the representation of the predicted feature reaches peak activity faster than a non-predicted feature. Figure reprinted from Roussel et al. (2013) with the publisher's permission.
The first account of sensory attenuation assumes that the predicted sensory action-outcome are inhibited (Blakemore et al., 1998; Miall & Wolpert, 1996) . According to this account, a comparator mechanism subtracts the actual sensory outcome from predicted action-outcome. If the actual outcome matches the internally generated prediction, its representation will be weaker. If, on the other hand, the stimulus does not match the internal prediction its representation will be left intact ( Figure 1a) . The psychophysical demonstrations of sensory attenuation would generally fit the inhibition account (see, e.g., Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010) . Furthermore, event-related potentials associated with early auditory response (e.g., Bäß, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2009 ) and early visual response (e.g., Roussel et al., 2014; Kimura & Takeda, 2014) have been found to be weaker for a learned action-outcome, compared to a stimulus that mismatched the action-outcome (see also, Hughes & Waszak, 2011) . Again, these findings would fit the inhibition account, which assumes that Gozli et al. | Visual Cueing by Action-Outcomes 4 action-outcome associative learning enables inhibition of anticipated action-outcomes (Miall & Wolpert, 1996) .
The second account of sensory attenuation is based on internal preactivation of learned sensory outcomes. According to this account, planning an action is thought to increase activity of the cells that represent the anticipated sensory outcome (Roussel et al., 2013; Waszak et al., 2012) .
This sensory preactivation, in turn, limits any further increase in the cell's activity that is uniquely caused by external stimulation (Figure 1b) . Unlike the inhibition account, the preactivation account is not based on subtraction of two signals, but is based on the difficulty in detecting an external signal that is received during higher baseline activity. Akin to Weber's law, a stimulus that is encountered during preactivation evokes a weaker response, relative to a stimulus that is encountered against a lower baseline, i.e., without preactivation 3 . Given that the preactivation account also predicts weaker stimulus representation for action-outcomes, this account equally well fits the psychophysical observations of sensory attenuation (Bompass & O'Regan, 2006a; CardosoLeite et al., 2010; Roussel et al., 2012) . The preactivation account can also be reconciled with the attenuated electrophysiological response when we consider the fact that stimulus-elicited neural response is measured with the assumption of equal baseline activity level across conditions. This assumption is precisely what the preactivation account argues against; the baseline activity level is thought to increase for learned action-outcome, which in turn reduces the stimulus-elicited response.
The attenuated electrophysiological responses could, therefore, reflect the increase in the baseline activity that is typically neglected in measurement.
Critically, the preactivation account makes the additional prediction that the representation of sensory action outcome, although attenuated in strength, is formed faster due to the processing head-start provided by preactivation (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013) . The inhibition account, by contrast, predicts no processing speed advantage for action outcomes compared to actionincongruent colors. In the present study, we employed a visual task where the inhibition and the preactivation accounts offer conflicting predictions based on their assumptions with regard to processing speed of action-congruent and -incongruent stimuli.
The visual attention task we used included a salient spatial cue in which the cue colors were learned sensory outcomes of observers' keypress actions. We should note that previous methods of investigation have typically associated action with a feature of the target that remains central to the task in the test phase. As such, they are primarily sensitive to the strength of stimulus representation (i.e., salience), and how it might change as a function of known action outcomes (e.g., Bompass & O'Regan, 2006a; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Hughes & Waszak, 2011; Stenner et al., 2014) . By contrast, by associating a cue feature with actions, the present paradigm affords sensitivity to both the salience of representation and the speed with which that representation is formed (for comparable experimental designs see, e.g., Gozli, Goodhew, Moskowitz, & Pratt, 2013; Gozli & Pratt, 2011; Kumar, Manjaly, & Sunny, 2015) .
The sensitivity of the present paradigm to both salience and processing rate rests on the fact that we can investigate the effect of cues when they are spatially valid (indicating target location) and when they are spatially invalid (indicating a distractor location). With invalid cues we can assess feature salience, because lower salience of a cue feature allows faster attentional disengagement from the cue (Theeuwes, 2010) . On the other hand, with valid cues we can assess processing rate, because faster processing rate of a cue feature allows faster initial selection of the valid cue (cf., Bundesen, 1990 ). The inhibition account would predict that action-congruent colors will have lower salience compared to incongruent colors, although this account does not make a clear prediction about variations in processing speed. If anything, the inhibition process would more likely decrease the speed with which the representation of action-congruent cues reach peak activity level. If so, compared to action-incongruent cues, action-congruent cues will be easier to disengage from when invalid, and they will be selected more slowly when valid. By contrast, preactivation account holds that action-congruent colors will have lower salience but higher processing rate, compared to actionincongruent cue. Therefore, this account predicts that action-congruent cues will be easier to disengage from when invalid, and they will be selected faster when valid Waszak et al., 2012) .
Similar to previous work on sensory attenuation, the present experiment consisted of an acquisition phase and a test phase. During the acquisition phase, participants' keypress determined the color of the cue (one key producing red, the other producing green), while cue location was randomly selected from a set of four placeholders. Next, in a test phase, the same keys were followed by a cue and a search display (Figure 2 ). In the test phase, if a red cue appears after pressing the "red" key (i.e., the key that consistently produced red cues during acquisition), the cue Gozli et al. | Visual Cueing by Action-Outcomes 6 color is regarded as action-congruent, whereas it is regarded as action-incongruent if it appears after pressing the "green" key. Unlike previous studies, in addition to manipulating whether cue color was congruent with the learned action-outcome associations, we also manipulated the spatial validity of the cues. For one group, the cue was always invalid (indicating a distractor location), whereas for the other group, the cue was always valid (indicating the target location).
Figure 2. Sequence of events in a sample trial of the test phase in the "invalid cue" condition.
In summary, the inhibition account and the preactivation account both predict a smaller cost for action-congruent cues in the invalid-cue condition, but they make opposite predictions in the valid-cue condition. With valid cues, the inhibition account predicts smaller cueing with the actioncongruent color, whereas the preactivation account predicts larger cueing with action-congruent color due to the speeded processing caused by feature preactivation. background. The cue colors were red (XYZ = 41.24, 21.26, 1.93) and green (XYZ = 6.72, 13.43, 2.24). Placeholders were four squares (2.4° x 2.4°; frame width = .16°) that appeared above, below, left, and right of the display center (distance from center = 8°). When a placeholder turned into a color cue, its frame width increased to .24° of visual angle. The target was a tilted line ("\" vs. "/"; length = 1.4°; width= .1°) that would appear inside one placeholder. Each distractor was a letter "X" that appeared in a non-target placeholder. Participants performed two types of responses. The responses that produced visual effects were performed using the index and middle fingers of left hand and the 'Q' and 'A' buttons on the keyboard. We associated left-hand responses with actionoutcomes on the basis of prior research that suggests action-outcome associative learning may be stronger for left-hand responses (Melcher et al., 2008; . The search responses were performed with the right hand, using the left and right arrow keys (in response to "\" and "/" target, respectively).
Acquisition Phase. Each trial of the acquisition phase began with the presentation of the fixation cross and the four placeholders. After a random delay of 1000-1500 ms, the fixation cross flickered (i.e., it disappeared for 100 ms and then reappeared). We instructed participants to press either the 'Q' or the 'A' key upon noticing the flicker. Moreover, we instructed them to make their selection spontaneously, try to avoid patterns, and try to select the two keys equally frequently. As soon as a keypress was recorded, the color cue appeared at one of the placeholders. The color of the cue was determined by the response (red or green after 'Q' or 'A', respectively). The location of the cue was randomly chosen, as any of the four placeholders were equally likely be the cue location.
The cue remained on display for 300 ms, after which the next trial began. If participants pressed a key other than 'Q' or 'A', or if they pressed more than one key, they received visual feedback ("MISTAKE!"). If the response was faster than 100 ms, they also received visual feedback ("TOO FAST!"). No color cue was presented on error trials. The search task was not included in this phase.
Gozli et al. | Visual Cueing by Action-Outcomes 8
Test Phase. Similar to the acquisition phase, every test trial began with the presentation of the fixation cross and the four placeholders (Figure 2 ). Participants performed their first, left-hand response when they noticed the fixation mark flicker. There were three equiprobable types of trials, based on the color cue. The cue could be congruent with the response-outcome associations during the acquisition phase, incongruent, or absent (i.e., no cue/action-outcome). After a 100-ms delay, the cue was followed by the appearance of the search items in the placeholders. The cue and the search display remained on display until a response was recorded. For the search display, we instructed participants to find the tilted line among the distractors ("X"s) and identify the target tilt using the left/right arrow keys. Upon pressing an incorrect key, or pressing more than one key, participants received a visual feedback ("MISTAKE!"). Finally, if the first response was a mistake, participants received visual feedback and no search display or cue was presented.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to the valid-cue or invalid-cue condition. The two conditions had the same acquisition phase. In the test phase, the cue was either valid or invalid.
An invalid cue never coincided with target location and had to be ignored. A valid cue always coincided with target location and, thus, had to be selected. Each participant completed 200 trials in the acquisition phase and 128 trials in the test phase. Each phase was preceded by 15 practice trials.
RESULTS

Acquisition.
Before calculating mean response times (RT), we excluded error trials and trials in which RT fell 2.5 SD beyond the total mean. Mean RT and percentage of errors (PE) in the acquisition phase were 379 (SE = 63 ms) and 3.0% (SE = .5%). Furthermore, participants selected the two keys with equal frequency (51% and 49%, respectively, for the 'Q' and 'A' keys, t[35] =1.71, SE = .02, p = .10).
Test. For the first voluntary keypress made with the left hand, mean RT and PE in the test
phase were 352 ms (SE = 59) and 2.6% (SE = .4%). Furthermore, participants continued to select both keys, although they slightly favored the 'A' key, corresponding to the green cue, over the 'Q' key, corresponding to the red cue (44.8% and 55.2%, t[35] = 2.16, SE = .05, p = .038).
For the search task, mean RTs were submitted to a 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Cue Color (absent, congruent, or incongruent) as the within-subject factor and Cue Validity (valid vs. invalid) as the between-subject factor (Figure 3 ). This analysis revealed a marginal main effect of Cue Validity showing that congruent colors conferred a benefit both when they were valid and when they were with congruent (5.1% ± 1.8%) and incongruent cues (4.5% ± 1.1%, p = .50), inconsistent with the possibility that the RT difference was a speed-accuracy trade-off.
DISCUSSION
Sensory events that are self-caused typically evoke an attenuated response, compared to physically identical sensory events that are caused by external sources (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2013) . The present study investigated two accounts of sensory attenuation (inhibition vs. preactivation) using a visuospatial task, in which the color of a salient cue could be linked to participants' own action. In an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that red and green cues consistently resulted from their own key-press actions. In the subsequent test phase, cues continued to result from participants' action, but their colors could be congruent or incongruent with the action-outcome contingencies learned in the acquisition phase.
We found that action-congruent cues were easier to ignore in the invalid-cue condition, consistent with both the inhibition account and the preactivation account. Importantly, we found actioncongruent cues to be more effective in the valid-cue condition, suggesting that self-caused features can be selected faster. This finding is consistent with the preactivation account, according to which self-caused features receive a processing head-start that speeds their processing, despite reducing their salience.
Our findings are consistent with a recent report by Desantis et al. (2014) . In their study, participants' learned to associate their actions with motion signals of a particular direction (key 1 and key 2, respectively causing upward and downward motion). After the acquisition phase, participants performed the same keys and had to discriminate motion direction at a 75% discrimination Roussel et al., 2013) . Applying a similar logic to the present study, we argue that action-congruent cues had an initial competitive advantage in visual selection, provided by the internal preactivation.
This initial advantage increased the benefit of valid cues. The same preactivation, however, also reduced the salience of action-congruent cues, allowing for rapid disengagement in the invalid-cue condition. Thus, whether feature preactivation confers an advantage or a disadvantage depends on specific characteristics of each task.
Our proposal, which is based on variations in both salience and processing speed, should be considered against alternative proposals that are based either on salience alone or processing speed 4 .
One could argue that an increase in cue salience (due to action-congruency), which leads to faster initial selection in the valid-cue condition, also leads to faster disengagement in the invalid-cue condition. In other words, faster initial selection enables faster disengagement. This would only be true if we assume constancy in attentional dwell time despite variations in salience. This assumption is not easily justified, given that an increase in salience often leads to faster (and more probable) initial selection and slower disengagement, both of which indicate longer attentional dwell time for more salient items compared to less salient items (e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2013; Belopolsky, Scherij, & Theeuwes, 2010; Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; Theeuwes, 2010) . For this reason, faster performance in the invalid-cue condition of our experiment cannot be easily explained if we rely solely on the assumption of increased cue salience. Alternatively, one might leave out the consideration of salience and consider only faster processing for action-congruent cues, which would again fit with faster initial selection and faster disengagement. Although focusing on the overall performance improvement would connect the present finding with the literature on actioninduced visual facilitation (e.g., Craighero et al., 2002; Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009; Linnell et al., 2005) , it would fail to explain the underlying cause of the increase in processing speed in the present context. We would have to evoke an underlying explanation, such as the preactivation account, which would not be silent about changes in salience. Not considering changes in cue salience would also disregard previous reports of sensory attenuation found using similar designs (e.g., Bompass & O'Regan, 2006a; 2006b; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Pfister et al., 2012; Roussel et al., 2013) . Given that our experiment was motivated by the repeated demonstration of sensory attenuation (i.e., reduced salience) found with very similar acquisition phase, we cannot disregard variations in salience in our explanation.
The role of action in shaping perception has gained increased recognition (e.g., Hommel, 2009; O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Thomaschke, Hopkins, & Miall, 2012 ; for a review, see Pratt, Taylor, & Gozli, in press ). Actions change the sensory input we receive from the environment, and it is reasonable to suppose the perceptual systems take advantage of the regularities that connect our actions with their corresponding sensory outcomes (e.g., Eslner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2004; O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Shin et al., 2010) . Indeed, evidence suggests that preparing an action not only involves activity in motor-cortical areas, but also activity in sensory areas that underlie the expected outcome of the action (e.g., Gutteling et al., 2015) . In a study by Kuhn et al. (2010) , participants learned that their keypress actions produced house or face images.
After learning the action-outcome associations, participants' actions alone activated the sensory regions corresponding to visual processing of faces or houses. In a similar paradigm, Hughes and Waszak (2014) found modulated activity in the posterior visual areas, prior to action execution, depending on whether participants selected a face-or house-generating action. Thus, sensory brain regions are involved in the coding of actions, through the learned sensory outcomes of the actions.
It is important to consider whether actions are unique in their ability to modulate the effect of visual stimuli. Is it the intention to perform an action that results in preactivation of the color red, or is it, for instance, the tactile sensation associated with the action that causes the preactivation? An attempt to reduce the effect of actions to sensory components of the action, remains consistent with the notion that sensory anticipation is essential to action representation .
According to such a view, the learned sensory outcomes of an action, collectively, constitute the representation of the action Shin et al., 2010) . In other words, features of an action are not inherently distinct from features of perceptual events. Thus, to ask whether actions are unique in their ability to serve as a source of visual bias goes against this fundamental assumption, by restoring the strong distinction between action-and perception-related features.
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The idea that an action is represented in terms of its collective sensory outcomes is consistent with Hoffmann et al. (2009) . In their study, participants learned that keypress actions were associated with two distinct auditory outcomes. After this acquisition phase, auditory stimuli can generate a bias in selecting their corresponding actions. In order to examine action components, Hoffmann et al. tested whether the auditory signals were associated with a finger movement (regardless of key) or pressing a specific key (regardless of finger). Interestingly, neither the finger movements nor the keypresses alone evoked the auditory associations. It was only when the fingerkey combinations were preserved that action selection was sensitive to concurrent auditory stimuli.
In other words, dissecting the action into components eliminated the action-outcome associations.
It is worth considering whether the same modulated biases could be observed without the involvement of actions. Indeed, in agreement with Waszak et al. (2012) , we propose that the actiondriven effects in the present study are similar to the effect of repeated exposure to the same feature (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012) . Similar to our findings, ignoring a consistently-invalid peripheral cue has been shown to be more efficient if cue color repeats across trials (cue color being a task-irrelevant feature), while selecting a consistently-valid cue is also more efficient if cue color repeats across trials (e.g., Pinto et al., 2005; Vatterott & Vecera, 2012) . Waszak et al. (2012) have attributed the efficiency that comes with repeated exposure to a feature to sensory preactivation, suggesting that preactivation is not unique to action performance.
In conclusion, we argue that actions function as a source of visual bias by virtue of generating sensory preactivation of known action-outcomes. In line with sensorimotor accounts of vision, our study suggests that the visual system is sensitive to the learned associations that connect dynamic features of the action systems to sensory outcomes.
